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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal from the dismissal of a putative class 
action, we are asked to decide whether plaintiffs Andrew J. 
Ormond and Jack Xie, former employees of Allergan plc 
(“Allergan,” or the “Company”) and participants in the 
Company’s employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”), have 
plausibly alleged that the defendants breached certain fiduciary 
duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”).1  According to the plaintiffs, the defendants, 
who are numerous individuals and entities responsible for 
 
1  The named plaintiffs brought suit individually, 
derivatively on behalf of the Plans (as defined below), and as 
representatives of a purported class of similarly-situated Plan 
participants.  We refer to these constituencies collectively as 




administering or supervising the Company’s benefit plans,2 
knew or should have known that the Company’s stock price 
was artificially inflated as a result of an illegal price-fixing 
conspiracy, yet they took no action to prevent the plaintiffs 
from acquiring Allergan stock at falsely inflated prices.    
 
 Having considered the complaint, we agree with the 
District Court that, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, the well-pled factual allegations fail 
to support a plausible inference that the Company conspired 
with competitors to fix prices.  Because all of the plaintiffs’ 
causes of action ultimately rest on the premise that the 
defendants knew or should have known about that supposed 
illegal conduct, the absence of allegations sufficient to support 
the existence of it is fatal to each of their claims.  Furthermore, 
we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 
decision to deny the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.  
The plaintiffs’ perfunctory request in that regard not only failed 
to include a proposed amended complaint but also lacked any 
description of or explanation about the modifications they 
might make.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
 
2  The defendants are comprised of: Allergan; its 
Employee Benefits Plan, Oversight, and Investment 
Committees (and the individual members of those committees, 
both known and unknown); the individual members of the 
Company’s Board of Directors (the “Director Defendants”); 
and any other known or unknown committees or individuals 
who served as Plan fiduciaries from October 29, 2013 through 






A. Factual Background 
 
The plaintiffs are participants in the Allergan, Inc. 
Savings and Investment Plan (the “Plan,” and, together with its 
predecessor plans, the “Plans”),3  which includes various 
investment options for its participants.  One of those is an 
ESOP feature, through which participants can buy Allergan 
stock.  According to the plaintiffs, the various defendants in 
this dispute were Plan fiduciaries within the meaning of ERISA 
and owed them commensurate duties under that statute.  
 
 The central tenet of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that, 
although the public was unaware, at least some of the 
defendants knew or should have known that, prior to the 
divestiture of its generic-drug business,4 Allergan had 
 
3  The Plan, which traces its origins back to 1988, exists 
in its current form following a series of name changes, 
corporate acquisitions, and other modifications that are not 
relevant to the disposition of this appeal.   
 
4  Allergan completed the sales of its “Global Generics” 
and “ANDA Distribution” businesses to Teva Pharmaceuticals 
on August 2, 2016 and October 3, 2016, respectively.  (App. 
70-71.)  The plaintiffs do not allege that Allergan engaged in 
price fixing subsequent to the divestitures.  To the extent it is 
relevant, and no party argues that it is, the slight discrepancy 
between the date of Allergan’s divestitures and the end of the 
Class Period appears to be attributable to November 2, 2016 
being the last date that Allergan publicly announced quarterly 
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conspired with other generic-drug manufacturers to fix prices, 
thereby artificially boosting its financial performance, and, in 
turn, its stock price.5  As support for their price-fixing theory, 
the plaintiffs allege that, during October 2014 to June 2015, a 
time when generic-drug prices in general were surging, 
Allergan received inquiries both from members of Congress 
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) seeking information about large price increases in 
certain of the generic drugs it manufactured.  According to 
news reports cited by the plaintiffs, the DOJ charged some 
unidentified person or entity involved in the generic-drug 
industry with price-fixing, as part of “a sweeping criminal 
investigation into suspected price collusion,” and the DOJ was 
“expected to remain active in pursuing generic-drug price 
fixing[.]”  (App. 73.)  The plaintiffs do not allege that Allergan 
was ever charged in connection with the DOJ investigation.  
Nevertheless, they say that the defendants’ failure to remove 
Allergan stock as an investment option from the Plan, or 
otherwise take any action to protect the Plan participants from 
 
financial and operating results reflecting the operations of the 
divested generics businesses.   
 
5  The plaintiffs also contend that the Company lacked 
effective internal controls over its financial reporting systems.  
That contention appears simply to be support for their 
overarching argument that Allergan’s financials did not reflect 
the effects of the alleged price-fixing conspiracy.  Indeed, the 
complaint is devoid of any well-pled allegations that could, 
premised only on the Company’s supposed lack of internal 




Allergan’s inflated stock prices, violated fiduciary duties owed 
under ERISA. 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
This case originated as two separate actions filed by Xie 
and Ormond, Xie’s in the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California, and Ormond’s in the District 
Court here.  Xie agreed to transfer his case, and, shortly 
thereafter, the actions were consolidated in the District Court 
under the caption “In re Allergan ERISA Litigation.”  (App. 8.)  
Following consolidation, the plaintiffs filed a three-count 
amended complaint – the operative complaint here – alleging: 
a failure to prudently manage the Plans’ assets, in violation of 
ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(B) and 405 (Count One); breach of the 
duty of loyalty, in violation of ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(A) and 405 
(Count Two); and failure to adequately monitor other 
fiduciaries and provide accurate information, in violation of 
ERISA § 404 (Count Three).   
 
 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its 
entirety, which was granted.  Regarding Count One, the 
District Court held that it was insufficiently pled for two 
independent reasons.  First, according to the Court, the 
plaintiffs failed to “set forth sufficient facts to establish” or 
even imply that the defendants had “engaged in collusive 
and/or fraudulent activity during the Class Period such that 
they could have insider information to that effect.”  (App. 13.)  
Second, even if the defendants possessed any such insider 
information, the Court determined that the plaintiffs still could 
not state a claim because, under Fifth Third Bancorp v. 
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Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014),6 a prudent fiduciary could 
have concluded that any of the plaintiffs’ proposed alternatives 
to doing nothing about their supposed knowledge of the alleged 
price-fixing would do more harm than good to the Plan 
participants.     
 
The District Court then proceeded to dismiss Count 
Two – the duty of loyalty claim – as being merely “derivative 
of [the] insufficiently pled duty of prudence claim[]” in Count 
One (App. 17-18.)  And, absent any well-pled claim for a 
breach of an ERISA duty, the Court concluded that Count 
Three – the duty to monitor claim – necessarily failed too.  
Finally, the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for 
leave to amend their complaint because “[t]here [wa]s nothing 
to suggest that providing another opportunity to amend the 
pleadings would be beneficial or result in a different outcome.”  
(App. 19 n.11.) 
 
 The plaintiffs timely appealed.  After the briefing for 
this appeal was completed, but shortly before oral argument, 
 
6  Dudenhoeffer was a watershed decision by the 
Supreme Court in which it rejected the consensus among courts 
of appeals that ESOP fiduciaries are entitled to a “presumption 
of prudence.”  Id. at 412.  Instead, the Court held that, “[t]o 
state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of 
inside information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an 
alternative action that the defendant could have taken that 
would have been consistent with the securities laws and that a 
prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have 





the Supreme Court granted certiorari review of the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Jander v. Retirement Plans Committee of 
IBM, 910 F.3d 620 (2d Cir. 2018), another case involving 
ERISA’s duty of prudence in the ESOP context.  Because the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jander had the potential to clarify 
or modify Dudenhoeffer, the parties jointly requested that we 
hold this matter curia advisari vult, pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision in that case.  We did so.  When the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Jander earlier this year, this matter 




A. Plaintiffs’ ERISA Claims9 
 
The “thrust” of the plaintiffs’ allegations in Counts One 
and Two of the complaint is that the “[d]efendants 
 
7  The Supreme Court elected not to reach the merits of 
the dispute in Jander because the parties raised new arguments 
that were not presented to the Second Circuit.  Ret. Plans 
Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592, 594–95 (2020).  
Instead, the Court vacated the Second Circuit’s opinion and 
remanded the matter for the Second Circuit to decide in the first 
instance whether it wished to consider those new arguments.  
Id. at 595.  On remand, the Second Circuit declined to consider 
the new arguments and reinstated its original decision.  Jander 
v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 962 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2020).  
 
8  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
9  “We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 
10 
 
[imprudently and disloyally] allowed the investment of the 
Plans’ assets in Allergan Stock throughout the Class Period 
despite the fact that [d]efendants knew or should have known 
that that investment was imprudent[.]”  (App. 25.)  According 
to the plaintiffs, Allergan stock was a poor investment during 
the Class Period because “Allergan and several of its 
pharmaceutical industry peers colluded to fix generic-drug 
prices in violation of federal antitrust laws, creating excess 
revenues as a result of anticompetitive behaviors and putting 
Allergan at risk of criminal prosecution and civil and criminal 
penalties[.]”  (App. 71.)  Moreover, the plaintiffs say, “[the 
d]efendants, as Allergan insiders, knew or should have known 
that the Company was conspiring to raise its profits in violation 
 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 
LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).  
In conducting such a review, “[w]e take as true all the factual 
allegations of the … Complaint and the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from them, but we disregard legal 
conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements.  To survive a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  A 
claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[W]e may 
affirm a judgment of a lower court for any reason supported by 
the record ….”  In re Ross, 858 F.3d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citation omitted).  
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of antitrust laws.” (App. 74.)  Thus, the threshold issue in 
analyzing the ERISA claims here is whether the plaintiffs have 
plausibly alleged any facts to back up their assertion that 
Allergan participated in an unlawful price-fixing conspiracy.  
Absent such allegations, there was nothing that the defendants 
knew or should have known that ought to have prompted them 
to protect the putative class from acquiring Allergan stock.  As 
the District Court correctly held, the plaintiffs’ complaint is 
deficient at this initial step.  
 
The factual allegations that supposedly demonstrate that 
Allergan was involved in such a conspiracy are scant and can 
be summarized as follows: (i) the market for generic drugs is 
highly competitive; (ii) the prices for several generic drugs 
increased markedly over a brief period of time; (iii) certain 
members of Congress sought to investigate the increases; (iv) 
in connection with that investigation, Allergan was asked to 
provide information about price increases for certain generic 
drugs it manufactures; (v) several months later, Allergan 
received a subpoena from the DOJ requesting information 
about the marketing and pricing of some of its generic products 
and communications with competitors regarding the same; and 
(vi) over a year after receiving the subpoena, the DOJ brought 
price-fixing charges against at least one unnamed party – but 
not Allergan – related to generic drugs, and the DOJ was 
“expected to remain active in pursuing generic-drug price 
fixing[.]” (App. 73.)  
 
Considered holistically, and taking all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, those allegations fail to 
support a plausible inference that Allergan conspired with 
other generic-drug manufacturers to fix prices.  At most, the 
plaintiffs’ complaint can be described as alleging parallel price 
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increases among generic-drug manufacturers, including 
Allergan.  But, despite the plaintiffs’ insistence to the contrary, 
the Supreme Court has been clear “that an allegation of parallel 
conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).  Rather, 
because “parallel conduct[, without more,] does not suggest 
conspiracy,” allegations of parallel conduct “must be placed in 
a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not 
merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent 
action.”  Id. at 557; see also In re Chocolate Confectionary 
Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence 
of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable 
inference of a conspiracy.  To move the ball across the goal 
line, a plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors are 
present. Plus factors are ‘proxies for direct evidence’ because 
they tend[ ] to ensure that courts punish concerted action—an 
actual agreement—instead of the unilateral, independent 
conduct of competitors.” (second alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Burtch v. 
Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 226 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The 
law is well-established that evidence of parallel conduct by 
alleged co-conspirators is not sufficient to show an 
agreement.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
 
 
The plaintiffs have not placed their allegations in any 
such context.  That Allergan received requests for information 
from Congress and the DOJ as part of broad investigations, 
requests the Company apparently complied with, does not on 
its own suggest the existence of an agreement among Allergan 
and its competitors.  That is particularly so where, as here, there 
are no well-pled allegations either of communications or 
interactions among Allergan and its competitors, or even of 
13 
 
opportunities for such communications or interactions.  Nor are 
there allegations that the information gathering exercises the 
Company was subjected to resulted in any charge of 
wrongdoing against either Allergan or any of its competitors 
with respect to a product that Allergan manufactures.10  The 
plaintiffs have thus failed to plausibly allege Allergan’s 
participation in an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.  Because the 
defendants could not have had insider information about a 
price-fixing conspiracy that did not exist, or at least the 
existence of which was not adequately pled, it follows that the 
plaintiffs’ ERISA claims, each of which is predicated on the 
defendants’ knowledge of that purported conspiracy, must 
fail.11       
 
 
10  The complaint is devoid of any well-pled allegations 
that, during the approximately 28 months that passed between 
Allergan’s receipt of the DOJ’s subpoena and the filing of the 
operative complaint, Allergan was subject to any further 
scrutiny with respect to price-fixing, including further requests 
for information. 
 
11  Although not directly dependent on the defendants’ 
knowledge of a price-fixing conspiracy, the plaintiffs’ duty to 
monitor claim is indirectly based on the defendants having that 
knowledge because “whether [p]laintiffs’ monitoring claim 
survives depends on whether their underlying breach of 
fiduciary duty [of prudence and loyalty] claims survive.”  
(Appellants’ Reply Br. at 27 n.18.)  Rinehart v. Lehman Bros. 
Holdings Inc., 817 F.3d 56, 68 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiffs 
cannot maintain a claim for breach of the duty to monitor ... 
absent an underlying breach of the duties imposed under 
ERISA[.]” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).  
14 
 
The plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are not 
persuasive.  First, they criticize the District Court’s holding 
that the allegations in the complaint “do not rise above the 
speculative level of misconduct.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 
15 (quoting (App. 13)).)  As they see it, they specifically 
alleged an “unconscionable increase in price [for a drug 
Allergan manufactures,]” and that increase “is well beyond 
speculation; it is fact.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 15.)  But 
that criticism ignores the central thesis of their own allegations.  
The plaintiffs do not contend that an increase in generic-drug 
prices, even a dramatic one, is itself a legal wrong that should 
have prompted the defendants to prevent the putative class 
from acquiring Allergan stock.  Rather, they theorize that the 
price increase in this case constituted misconduct because it 
was attributable to an unlawful price-fixing conspiracy.  As 
already discussed, however, even parallel price increases 
among competitors, without more, do not by themselves 
indicate the existence of an illegal conspiracy.  Accordingly, 
while the plaintiffs have alleged that the price for at least one 
drug that Allergan manufactured increased significantly, that 
fact does “not nudge[] their claims [of misconduct in the form 
of illegal price-fixing] across the line from conceivable to 
plausible[.]”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
 
The plaintiffs next argue that the District Court ignored 
their “well-pled and plausible allegations that ‘(i) Allergan and 
several of its pharmaceutical industry peers colluded to fix 
generic drug prices in violation of federal antitrust laws … 
putting Allergan at risk of criminal prosecution and civil and 
criminal penalties; [and] (ii) the DOJ investigation and the 
underlying conduct could result in criminal charges[.]’”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 16 (quoting (App. 71)).)  This 
argument fails because the allegations referred to are not well-
15 
 
pled facts but are instead conclusions entitled to no deference.  
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[A] court 
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While 
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, 
they must be supported by factual allegations.”)  The District 
Court did not err in refusing to credit such assertions absent 
supporting factual allegations. 
 
Third, the plaintiffs say that the District Court was 
wrong to dismiss their complaint on the basis that they had “not 
set forth sufficient facts to establish or even [imply] that 
[d]efendants engaged in collusive and/or fraudulent activity 
during the Class Period such that they could have insider 
information to that effect.” (App. 13.)  According to the 
plaintiffs, “nothing in ERISA suggests that [p]laintiff[s] must 
prove that collusive or fraudulent activity occurred; ERISA 
indisputably does not require allegations of scienter.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 17.)  But they again ignore the 
premise of their own complaint.  Regardless of whether ERISA 
requires proof of “collusive or fraudulent activity,” the 
plaintiffs specifically chose a theory of liability predicated on 
Allergan’s participation in an unlawful price-fixing 
conspiracy.  In advancing that theory, they assumed the burden 
of plausibly alleging both the existence of a price-fixing 
conspiracy and Allergan’s participation in it.  The plaintiffs 
identify no other insider information that the defendants should 
have acted on with respect to their administration of the Plans.  
Moreover, it is simply not accurate that the District Court either 
explicitly or implicitly analyzed the price-fixing allegations 
under some heightened pleading standard.  The plaintiffs’ 
claims were not dismissed because of a failure to adequately 
16 
 
allege scienter.  Rather, the claims were rejected as insufficient 
because the plaintiffs’ antitrust allegations fall far short of 
plausibly suggesting the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy 
to begin with, as judged under ordinary pleading standards.  
The District Court was correct in saying so.    
 
Finally, citing Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 
F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009), the plaintiffs contend that “[i]t could 
not be expected that at this stage [they] would have more 
information regarding what [d]efendants knew about 
Allergan’s concealed impropriety.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. 
at 18.)  But this contention too misses the mark.  The deficiency 
in the plaintiffs’ pleading was the lack of factual allegations 
plausibly suggesting Allergan actually engaged in any 
misdeeds (i.e., there was nothing for the defendants to know), 
not that the plaintiffs insufficiently alleged the defendants’ 
knowledge of the supposed misdeeds.  
 
 In short, the District Court properly concluded that the 
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege the existence of the price-
fixing conspiracy that underlies the complained-of breaches of 
fiduciary duty.  That failure defeats each of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.12   
 
12 Beyond that failure, the District Court also held that 
the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that either Allergan or 
the Director Defendants were fiduciaries of the Plans, and 
dismissed all claims against them on that basis.  The plaintiffs 
expressly state that they “do not contest” the Court’s dismissal 
of Allergan, (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 6 n.1,) but do not 
address the Director Defendants’ dismissal on that basis.  By 
that omission, the plaintiffs have forfeited their right to 




B. Leave to Amend13 
 
The plaintiffs also argue that the District Court abused 
its discretion by denying them leave to file an amended 
complaint and dismissing their claims with prejudice.  More 
specifically, they say that the District Court was wrong to view 
their complaint as the fourth attempt to state a claim and that 
 
Accordingly, we will also affirm Allergan’s and the Director 
Defendants’ dismissal with prejudice, as well as the dismissal 
of Count Three, which was pled only against those defendants, 
on the ground that none of those defendants are Plan fiduciaries 
under ERISA.   
    
13  “[W]e review a Rule 15 motion for leave to amend a 
complaint for abuse of discretion[.]”  United States ex rel. 
Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC. v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 
242, 248 (3d Cir. 2016).  “We are mindful that the pleading 
philosophy of the Rules counsels in favor of liberally 
permitting amendments to a complaint.”  CMR D.N. Corp. v. 
City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 629 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted).  But, “[s]tanding in tension with the long-standing 
amendment rule is our longer-standing rule that, to request 
leave to amend a complaint, the plaintiff must submit a draft 
amended complaint to the court so that it can determine 
whether amendment would be futile.”  Fletcher-Harlee Corp. 
v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citation omitted).  Ultimately, a motion to amend is 
committed to the “sound discretion of the district court.”  
Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 




they “should not be precluded from the possibility of being 
afforded at least one opportunity to cure the pleading 
deficiencies outlined by the District Court in its opinion.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 50.)  We agree that the complaint 
at issue should not have been viewed as the “fourth” attempt at 
presenting a viable pleading.14  But the Court did not actually 
deny leave to amend on that basis.  It articulated a different 
reason for denying leave, namely that the plaintiffs had failed 
to identify what modifications they proposed to make to their 
complaint.  That was true.  Despite the flaws pointed out by the 
defendants in the motion to dismiss and associated briefing, the 
plaintiffs gave no hint as to how they would further amend their 
complaint.15  In light of that, we cannot say the District Court 
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.      
 
The District Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ request for 
leave to amend as follows: 
 
 
14  The plaintiffs’ previous three complaints were a 
function of this case originating as two separate lawsuits that 
were eventually consolidated, not incremental attempts to 
resolve identified deficiencies.  None of the three prior 
complaints were subject to challenge by a dispositive motion.      
 
15  The plaintiffs’ request merely consisted of statements 
that “[m]ost courts navigating the post-Dudenhoeffer world 
have been relatively lenient about allowing plaintiffs to file 
amended complaints where they have fallen short of satisfying 
Dudenhoeffer’s difficult pleading standard[,]”  and “[i]n this 
Court, dismissal is frequently granted without prejudice to the 
filing of an amended complaint.”  (App. 138.) 
19 
 
Although [p]laintiffs have requested to amend 
their Consolidated Complaint if [d]efendants’ 
motion is granted, a review of this matter’s 
procedural history shows that, collectively, 
[p]laintiffs have now filed four complaints. 
There is nothing to suggest that providing 
another opportunity to amend the pleadings 
would be beneficial or result in a different 
outcome. See, e.g., Graham v. Fearon, 721 F. 
App’x 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[B]ecause 
Plaintiffs’ request was perfunctory and did not 
point to any additional factual allegations that 
would cure the complaint, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to 
amend.”); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent 
Conveyance Litig., No. 12- 2652, 2017 WL 
82391, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (denying 
leave to amend where the request was cursory 
and failed to indicate how the complaint’s 
defects would be cured).  
 
(App. 19 n.11.) 
 
 Although the Court noted the number of complaints 
filed in this case, its ratio decidendi for denying leave was the 
plaintiffs’ failure to explain how they proposed to further 
revise their complaint.  Again, the record supports that 
reasoning, and the legal authorities relied on by the Court 
particularly highlight its focus on the inadequacy of the request 
for leave to amend.   
 
 To the extent the plaintiffs argue that they should be 
permitted to amend because other antitrust and securities 
20 
 
litigation cases against Allergan, which also are premised on 
the Company’s participation in a price-fixing conspiracy, have 
survived motions to dismiss, we disagree for two reasons.  
First, the complaints in those cases contained far more robust 
factual allegations regarding Allergan’s participation in an 
unlawful conspiracy. See In re Allergan Generic Drug Pricing 
Sec. Litig., No. 2:16-cv-09449-KSH-CLW, 2019 WL 
3562134, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2019) (“The complaint alleges 
both direct and indirect evidence of an agreement. For 
example, plaintiffs point to communications between 
executives of different companies regarding price increases, at 
least two of whom pleaded guilty to violating antitrust laws. 
Plaintiffs also point to various opportunities to collude, 
including a host of communications and various trade 
association meetings; relevant market conditions and 
attributes; and the timing of parallel price increases.”); In re 
Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 404, 
420-35 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (detailing extensive allegations 
regarding price increases, government investigations, market 
conditions, and opportunities to conspire).  
 
 Second, and perhaps of greater significance, the 
complaints in those cases were available to the plaintiffs before 
they filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss in late-
March 2018.  So too was the public information that many of 
the allegations in those other complaints were derived from, 
including, in particular, the widely publicized price-fixing civil 
lawsuit commenced by a group of several state attorneys 
general against Allergan and other generic-drug 
manufacturers.  The plaintiffs could have, and should have, 
availed themselves of those sources of information, especially 
in light of their admitted understanding that those sources were 
relevant to their claims.  (See App. 23 n.2 (statement in 
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complaint that “[a]ll allegations contained herein are based 
upon … the investigation of [p]laintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs 
through their counsel reviewed, among other things … other 
lawsuits against Allergan … [and] public statements and media 
reports[.]”).)  They didn’t, nor did they refer to them when 
asking the District Court to let them amend. 
 
 We do not ask district courts to be mind readers but have 
instead recognized repeatedly that a district court does not 
abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend when the party 
seeking leave does not attach a draft amended complaint to its 
request.16  E.g., United States ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, 
LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 243 (3d Cir. 2013); DelRio-Mocci v. 
Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 
F.3d 247, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2007).  The plaintiffs here not only 
failed to include a draft complaint with their request for leave, 
they failed to say anything at all about how they intended to 
amend their pleading.17  Given the complete lack of 
information from the plaintiffs to aid the District Court in its 
assessment of their request to file another amended complaint, 
 
16  To be clear, however, we are neither adopting nor 
endorsing the view that the converse is also true.  Said 
differently, by recognizing that a district court acts within its 
discretion when it denies leave to amend where no proposed 
amendment is included in the request we do not mean to imply 
that a court necessarily abuses its discretion by allowing a party 
to amend without having submitted a proposed amendment. 
 
17  The plaintiffs’ briefing on appeal similarly is devoid 
of any explanation as to what additional facts or theories they 
would include in an amended pleading.   
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we cannot say that the Court acted outside the bounds of its 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of this case and the denial of the plaintiffs’ 
request for leave to amend. 
